Towards a quantum evolutionary scheme: violating Bell's inequalities in language

We show the presence of genuine quantum structures in human language. The neo-Darwinian evolutionary scheme is founded on a probability structure that satisfies the Kolmogorovian axioms, and as a consequence cannot incorporate quantum-like evolutionary change. In earlier research we revealed quantum structures in processes taking place in conceptual space. We argue that the presence of quantum structures in language and the earlier detected quantum structures in conceptual change make the neo-Darwinian evolutionary scheme strictly too limited for Evolutionary Epistemology. We sketch how we believe that evolution in a more general way should be implemented in epistemology and conceptual change, but also in biology, and how this view would lead to another relation between both biology and epistemology.Comment: 20 pages, no figures, this version of the paper is equal to the foregoing. The paper has meanwhile been published in another book series than the one tentatively mentioned in the comments given with the foregoing versio

A Quantum Cognition Analysis of the Ellsberg Paradox

The 'expected utility hypothesis' is one of the foundations of classical approaches to economics and decision theory and Savage's 'Sure-Thing Principle' is a fundamental element of it. It has been put forward that real-life situations exist, illustrated by the 'Allais' and 'Ellsberg paradoxes', in which the Sure-Thing Principle is violated, and where also the expected utility hypothesis does not hold. We have recently presented strong arguments for the presence of a double layer structure, a 'classical logical' and a 'quantum conceptual', in human thought and that the quantum conceptual mode is responsible of the above violation. We consider in this paper the Ellsberg paradox, perform an experiment with real test subjects on the situation considered by Ellsberg, and use the collected data to elaborate a model for the conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation of the paradox. We show that it is the conceptual landscape which gives rise to a violation of the Sure-Thing Principle and leads to the paradoxical situation discovered by Ellsberg.Comment: 11 page

The Pet-Fish problem on the World-Wide Web

We identify the presence of Pet-Fish problem situations and the corresponding Guppy effect of concept theory on the World-Wide Web. For this purpose, we introduce absolute weights for words expressing concepts and relative weights between words expressing concepts, and the notion of 'meaning bound' between two words expressing concepts, making explicit use of the conceptual structure of the World-Wide Web. The Pet-Fish problem occurs whenever there are exemplars - in the case of Pet and Fish these can be Guppy or Goldfish - for which the meaning bound with respect to the conjunction is stronger than the meaning bounds with respect to the individual concepts.Comment: 8 page